Introduction
On April 7, 2011, the World Health Organization embarked on a yearlong campaign to combat antibiotic resistance. The project is driven by several related concerns: resistance is rising, drug companies are producing fewer innovative antibiotics, and yet antibiotics continue to be used inappropriately. 1 Resistance v.12 -DRAFT 10/31/11
One prominent de--linkage mechanism is the Health Impact Fund (HIF) which would reward companies for the health impact of their drugs. 5 The HIF is a global mechanism, which is especially valuable in the field of antibiotics. Effective antibiotics are a global common pool, a potentially exhaustible resource that should be managed effectively on a global basis. 6 This essay is organized as follows. In Section II, we describe the original Health Impact Fund proposal in greater detail, including some of the criticisms that have been lodged concerning generic competition. The legal and biological complexities of resistance are explored in Section III. The legal ecology of resistance strongly suggests that new antibiotic incentives must be conditioned on meeting long--term public health goals. Otherwise, the rush to produce new antibiotics will only hasten the arrival of resistance. The confluence of antibiotic resistance and the HIF is the subject of Section IV, evaluating whether antibiotics might be an appropriate test of the HIF and whether the HIF might be an effective global coordination mechanism for antibiotics. We conclude that antibiotics as a class may be an appropriate first application of the HIF, but that the problems of cross--resistance will probably require all antibiotics to participate. Significant questions and limitations are noted.
The stakes are huge for getting these policies right; the Infectious Diseases antibiotic effectiveness. 7
II. The Health Impact Fund

A. Paying for Global Health Impact
Financed primarily by governments, the Health Impact Fund is a proposed pay--for--performance mechanism that would offer innovators the optioncompletely voluntary 8 -to register any new medicine. 9 By registering a product, the innovator would undertake to make it available, during its first 10 years on the market, wherever it is needed at no more than the lowest feasible cost of production and distribution. The innovator would further commit to allow, at no charge, generic production and distribution of the product after these ten years have ended (if the innovator still has unexpired patents on the product). In exchange, the registrant would receive, during that 10--year period, annual reward payments based on the product's health impact. The reward payments would be part of a large annual pay--out, with each registered product receiving a cash payment from the HIF proportional to its share of the assessed health impact of all HIF--registered products in the relevant year. 10 If the HIF were found to work well, its annual reward pool 7 Infectious Diseases Society of America, supra note 1; Infectious Diseases Society of America, BAD BUGS, NO DRUGS: AS ANTIBIOTIC DISCOVERY STAGNATES...A PUBLIC HEALTH CRISIS BREWS (2004) , available at http://www.idsociety.org/uploadedFiles/IDSA/Policy_and_Advocacy/Current_Topics_and_Issues/A dvancing_Product_Research_and_Development/Bad_Bugs_No_Drugs/Statements/As%20Antibiotic% 20Discovery%20Stagnates%20A%20Public%20Health%20Crisis%20Brews.pdf#search=%22BAD BUGS NO DRUGS%22 [hereinafter, BAD BUGS, NO DRUGS]. 8 As noted below, the problem of cross-resistance might require antibiotics to join the HIF in an all-ornothing system. 9 Under certain conditions, the HIF might also permit a company to register a traditional medicine or a new use of an existing medicine. 10 In some cases, the HIF may want to create contractual minimum and maximum payout amounts to reduce uncertainty for registrants.
could be scaled up to attract an increasing share of new medicines. 11
The HIF would foster the development of new high--impact medicinesincluding against diseases concentrated among the poor that are now neglected because innovators cannot recover their R&D costs from sales to the poor. 12 The option of an alternative reward based on health impact would transform heretofore--neglected diseases into some of the most lucrative pharmaceutical R&D opportunities. For example, many have suggested that antibiotic research isn't financially rewarding for large pharmaceutical companies. 13 The HIF would help to reverse that problem by offering an alternative revenue stream of up to several billion dollars per drug over the ten--year registration period.
The HIF would also promote appropriate financial access to new medicines by contractually limiting the price of any registered product to the lowest feasible cost of production and distribution. In addition, since the HIF only pays for actual health impact, the companies themselves are economically motivated to maximize access. The HIF rewards drug company registrants when their products are appropriately available to the neediest patients, perhaps at prices below marginal cost, and that they are competently prescribed and optimally used. Registrants would be rewarded not for selling their products, but for making them effective toward improving global health. For antibiotics, health impact will be maximized not necessarily through aggressive sales, but also through careful long--term If some pharmaceutical R&D were financed through tax--funded HIF rewards, most of the cost would be borne by affluent populations and people -just like today. But there are important differences. First, innovators would make no profit from the sale of their medicine as such -they would profit only insofar as this medicine is actually used to improve patient health. Second, in order to profit from serving affluent patients, innovators would not need to exclude poor patients. On the contrary, they would profit equally from serving poor patients, too, even if the drugs were offered at very low prices. Health gains achieved for any patients -rich or poor -would contribute equally toward the innovator's bottom line.
The HIF will provide optimal incentives only if potential registrants are assured that the rewards will actually be there in the decade following market approval. Core funding of the HIF is therefore best guaranteed by a broad partnership of countries. If governments representing one third of global income agreed to contribute just 0.03 percent of their gross national incomes (3 of every 10,000 currency units), the HIF could get started with USD 6 billion annually. This fixed pool of funds will be divided annually among registrants in proportion to the health impact of the registered drug. Thus, the HIF can be seen as an ongoing competition among innovators that ranges over all countries and all diseases, with firms earning more money if their product has a larger impact on health.
Health impact can be measured in terms of the number of quality--adjusted Excessive Marketing would also be much reduced for HIF--registered medicines. Because each innovator is rewarded for the health impact of its addition to the medical arsenal, incentives to develop me--too drugs to compete with an existing HIF--registered medicine would be weak. And innovators would have incentives to urge a HIF--registered drug upon doctors and patients only insofar as such marketing results in measurable therapeutic benefits for which the innovator would then be rewarded. In antibiotics, this feature will be especially welcome, as it removes financial pressures to promote resistance through excessive sales.
Counterfeiting of HIF--registered products would be less attractive. With the genuine item widely available near or even below the marginal cost of production, there is less to be gained from producing and selling counterfeits. 21
The Last--Mile Problem would be mitigated because each HIF--registered innovator would have strong incentives to ensure that patients are fully instructed and properly provisioned so that they make optimal use (dosage, compliance, etc.) of its medicines, which will then, through wide and effective deployment, have their optimal public health impact. Rather than ignore poor countries as unprofitable markets, pharmaceutical companies would, moreover, have incentives to work with one another and with national health ministries, international agencies and NGOs toward improving the health systems of these countries in order to enhance the impact of their HIF--registered medicines there.
C. Critiques of the Health Impact Fund
James Love of Knowledge Ecology International has criticized the HIF in a number of forums. 22 Love has proposed several global de--linkage mechanisms to pay for R&D outside of the market reimbursement system. 23 His primary substantive criticism is that the HIF leaves patents in the hands of the patent owners, thereby delaying market--based generic competition from multiple producers. Others share this concern in the broader context of prize proposals that rely on contractual access provisions. 24 In response to these criticisms, the HIF proposal was adjusted to permit: (a) sub--contracting (licensing) to generic firms; (b) tender systems; and (c) administratively determined prices. 25 the HIF has yet to be determined and it is likely that a variety of contract options may prove most attractive for different classes of medicines. With respect to antibiotics, because of the interest in conservation, there is a stronger rationale to prefer to limit the rights to produce and sell the drug, as we explore below.
Other practical concerns include measuring health impact in order to determine the prize payments and obtaining sufficient financial support to fund the HIF. Measurement will be a complex task, with many real--world epidemiological problems to solve, including tracking and disentangling the various causal factors implicated in health impact. Substantial work is underway to articulate appropriate metrics, but will not be detailed here, as it was the subject of a two--day conference at Harvard in November 2009 and ongoing work thereafter. In addition to measuring the health impact from antibiotics in a specific year, additional work is needed to consider the future health impact of inappropriate antibiotic use today.
The funding question will be dependent upon the political will to initiate a realistic test of the HIF. This essay outlines a therapeutic category of drugs for a potential large--scale test, namely systemic antibacterials.
III. The Legal Ecology of Antibiotic Resistance and the Need for Global Coordination
Before turning to the potential case of an antibiotic HIF (aHIF), we must briefly explore some of the unique legal and biological aspects of antibiotics. These unique characteristics make antibiotics an appealing candidate for a test of the HIF, but also suggest some aHIF modifications to account for the problem of resistance.
v.12 -DRAFT 10/31/11 13 Antibiotics may be the greatest single medical success of the twentieth century. If antibiotics were to lose their effectiveness, some of the advances in health over the previous seventy--five years would be threatened. The edifice of modern medicine rests upon the foundation of effective antibiotic therapies. But this achievement rests on an insecure foundation. As antibiotics are used, they create evolutionary pressure that threatens their undoing through resistance. 26 Resistance is an evolutionary dynamic.
Antibiotic effectiveness can also be understood as an ecological issue, a valuable common pool resource akin to productive fisheries. Common pools are prone to depletion and collapse through uncoordinated withdrawals, which is the history of the destruction of the vast herds of American buffalo in the Great Plains in the 19 th Century. 27 In the case of antibiotics, withdrawals occur as antibiotic resistance grows through use and misuse, including antibiotic pollution when resistance externalities are spread across populations and drugs. The common pool is renewed through conservation and the addition of new antibiotic therapies. We face a tragedy of the antibiotic commons as uncoordinated use, misuse and pollution of precious antibiotics may prematurely destroy these important drugs. 28 Incentives for new antibiotics must therefore be conditioned on addressing both 26 health, but would lower profits for drug companies and raise costs for some farmers. The aHIF would give companies an incentive to limit nontherapeutic agricultural uses, saving antibiotics for human use. Patent systems recover R&D costs through pricing above marginal cost. Firms will have incentives to exploit their patent through over--producing (relative to the social optimum) during the exclusivity period. Nor is it clear that society would be well served by pricing at marginal cost: unlike many drugs with deadweight losses due to lost sales, overuse of antibiotics could be welfare--reducing due to resistance.
The aHIF could rationalize these incentives by paying for health impact, not just product sales.
The third quandary is the relationship between resistance and innovation. pharmaceutical market are already de--linked, but not in a system that prioritizes global health impact. 39 To the extent that market--based pricing is an important element of the patent system, its absence in pharmaceuticals is quite troubling. If the primary market signals are muddled or broken, additional modifications to patent law should not be rolled out before the reimbursement system is fixed. 40 The aHIF side steps these problems by creating a new de--linkage mechanism to focus reimbursement on the most socially desirable pharmaceutical innovations.
Resistance spreads globally across political and geographic boundaries, giving rise to our fifth policy concern: antibiotic resistance is an ecological pollution problem that requires global coordination mechanisms that are not currently being provided by the market. Global coordination through the WHO is poorly funded and focused on conservation. Global coordination through the patent system is unhelpfully devoted to selling new drugs. As described above, conservation and new drug R&D incentives work at cross--purposes. By paying for human health impact anywhere on the planet, the aHIF would be uniquely well placed to globally coordinate these issues. drugs necessitated a withdrawal from the Reserve. 48 The analogy is to the strategic petroleum reserve, saving an exhaustible resource for a day of utmost need. The
Reserve is distinguished from the aHIF in that it pays for not using a drug, based on estimated future health impact. The Reserve and the aHIF are complementary but distinct proposals.
IV. The Antibiotic Health Impact Fund (aHIF)
In the following pages, we explore first the details of how the aHIF would impact R&D incentives for antibiotics, before turning to the issue of conservation. In both cases, the aHIF may be able to solve vexing problems in this sector, serving as a global coordinating mechanism to simultaneously promote appropriate use as well as boosting incentives for bringing important new antibiotics to market at the right time. The aHIF could encompass all systemic antibacterials for human use, or it could be more narrowly focused on antibiotics for hospital use, where the resistance problems are greatest and the potential for conservation gains more readily attainable.
A. The aHIF as a global coordination mechanism for new antibiotic development
The aHIF is very appealing as a global coordination mechanism for antibiotic R&D. For the first time, companies would be rewarded for producing antibiotics that were better than existing therapies, with the target being actual improvement v.12 -DRAFT 10/31/11 22 in human health as opposed to mere growth in unit sales. The aHIF would not function as a bureaucratic expert panel picking "winning" research programs.
Companies would continue to evaluate and prioritize their own research programs, but the aHIF reward will be proportional to the health impact rather than the ability to generate sales in high--income countries through aggressive marketing. The aHIF would offer little or no reward to a company for switching patients from an older but still effective antibiotic to its own, brand--new, aHIF--registered product because the incremental health impact would be slight. Under aHIF, the new market entrant does not appropriate the entire profit the other company derived from its existing sales, but only gets rewarded if and insofar as the switch is beneficial to patients' health. New antibiotics will receive aHIF rewards only to the extent it addresses an unmet need in human health, which dramatically re--orients antibiotic R&D goals in a socially desirable way.
The (2008), http://www.keionline.org/misc--docs/1/cost_benefit_UNITAID_patent_pool.pdf. 53 See Love, supra note 22. 54 Much empirical work is needed to fully understand this dynamic. If significant human health needs are currently unmet due to inadequate access to existing antibiotics, widespread generic access could improve human health. On the other hand, if antibiotics are already widely misused for inappropriate conditions, increased generic access could accelerate resistance without offsetting benefits to human health. One ancillary benefit to the aHIF would be the collection and dissemination of surveillance data on these issues.
conservation if long--term human health is to be maximized. As a result, concerns about generic access are uniquely less salient for the aHIF.
If we focus solely on producing new antibiotics to the exclusion of long--term conservation, then all we have done is to accelerate the final ecological collapse of every functional resistance group of antibiotics. Consider the following two charts.
The first is the oft--repeated chart on the decline in FDA approvals for antibiotics over the previous decades: 55 This decline might actually be a hopeful sign since antibiotics must be managed for long--term ecological and evolutionary balance, but the IDSA uses this chart to ask 1983--1987 1988--1992 1993--1997 1998--2002 2003--2007 2009--2012 Total New Antibacterial Agents v.12 -DRAFT 10/31/11 25 failure to view antibiotic resistance as an ecological problem can lead to grave errors. Consider the second chart, historical data on a previous ecological collapse, the near--extermination of the North American buffalo herds in the 1870s: 57 Confronted with this buffalo hide export data, the rational response in 1877 pools are potentially expandable through breeding (for buffalo) and new drug introductions (for antibiotics), and can be depleted through uncoordinated withdrawals (buffalo hunting or antibiotic pollution). If private benefits from the use of polluting antibiotics are perceived to be high, but private cost are kept very low, we can anticipate many withdrawals (antibiotic use), leading to the onset of resistance unless the common pool resource is managed for long--term sustainability. Put another way, we must understand global antibiotic policy as a primarily ecological and evolutionary management question. 59 The battle against microbes cannot be "won." Indeed, microbes are a significant percentage of our body weight and cellular census, with complex effects on health. The long--term goal is a sustainable balance between microbes and humanity.
In the HIF, long--term sustainability could be addressed by making additional rewards available to the extent that long--term antibiotic conservation goals are achieved. Conservation is the second major feature of our proposal, after de--linkage.
Conservation rewards are the mechanism for global antibiotic coordination through the HIF.
The HIF will require the assistance of public health experts to develop appropriate antibiotic conservation goals. Outterson and Kesselheim have described one possible model, which would focus on surveillance data of actual resistance levels as the key metric. Governments would set the conservation targets, but leave implementation to the companies themselves, perhaps in 59 Baquero, supra note 29.
partnership with governments and appropriate non--governmental organizations. 60 The defining feature of this model is the reluctance to use government to specify detailed regulations, assuming that the companies and NGOs have important information about the contours of the antibiotic markets and the heterogeneous policy tools available to reduce inappropriate use. While other models are certainly possible, reliance on the companies, in partnership with governments and NGOs, while holding the companies accountable for actual resistance targets, yields several interesting implications. The following chart summarizes these issues, which are then discussed in more detail in the text:
The aHIF as a Coordination Mechanism for Global Antibiotic Conservation.
Conservation incentives to companies
Examples of company implementation
Challenges for the aHIF approach Targets must be set appropriately, without company gaming; surveillance likewise must be independent and reliable First, companies would have a significant financial incentive to manage their antibiotics for long--term public health, rather than short--term sales. Companies would benefit most from getting the right drug to the right person at the right price, and would deploy their remarkable marketing talents to discourage inappropriate use. Companies might also make strategic market decisions. For example, Bayer owned the patents on both ciprofloxacin and a related antibiotic used in agriculture.
The battle to restrict non--therapeutic uses of antibiotics in animal feeds would be transformed if the company's profits from exploitation of these two products were contingent on meeting conservation goals. In the current regulatory battle over animal antibiotics, the government and companies question each other's data; in the aHIF, companies would use their own private data to make decisions to forgo animal sales.
Second, as described above, the biology of resistance might require multiple companies to coordinate their actions in order to hit resistance targets, maximize health impact, and minimize antibiotic pollution. Limited antitrust waivers (or state action protection via the aHIF) may be required. Antibiotic pollution might require aHIF registration to be an all--or--nothing offer to all antibiotic drugs in a functional resistance group. Unlike other therapeutic categories, antibiotics in the aHIF face v.12 -DRAFT 10/31/11 29 special challenges if some drugs are in the program but others - polluters with low health impact -remain outside. It should be noted that any company with an aHIF--registered antibiotic would have a clear incentive to manage its entire portfolio in order to achieve the aHIF resistance targets, even if it required changes to marketing plans for unregistered drugs. In this way, companies with one or more registered products would enjoy financial rewards for carefully managing even their antibiotics that are outside the aHIF.
It must be conceded that some companies might remain entirely outside the aHIF and yet choose to market their drugs in a fashion that polluted other antibiotics, including registered products. Such extreme cases might call for other remedies, including denying (or revoking) market access for such polluting, low--value drugs on public health grounds, or mandating registration with the aHIF. This is an empirical question that should not be answered a priori; we simply don't know yet whether cross--company antibiotic pollution from non--aHIF companies will undermine aHIF conservation goals to a significant degree.
Third, since resistance emerges gradually over time, the proper time frame for the aHIF might be much longer than ten years. If an antibiotic remained in the aHIF for 20 years or more with significant continuing health impact, then the company should continue to receive the reward, so long as it met the resistance targets. New antibiotics might be delayed, especially ones not quite as good as existing drugs, but that need not bother us. Indeed, social welfare over the coming decades would be enhanced by just such a delay, saving these drugs for a time when resistance to other drugs has improved the relative effectiveness of this new drug.
In addition to stretching the aHIF reward period beyond the usual 10 years for antibiotics, one might also consider delaying the start of the aHIF period for some antibiotics that are not urgently required. Here the aim would be to encourage the innovator to delay efforts to achieve extensive use of its product to the future period in which such wide use can make the greatest contribution to global health. Limited use for extreme cases might be appropriate during these Strategic Antimicrobial Reserve periods.
Fourth, companies will be incentivized to solve many significant "last mile" problems in antibiotics. One such problem involves the availability of rapid point--of--care diagnostics to distinguish between viral and bacterial infections. In the absence of such a test, many clinicians resort to empiric therapy with broad spectrum antibiotics. Treating a virus with antibiotics does not affect the virus, but may negatively affect the health of the patient while also facilitating resistance.
From the financial perspective of a drug company that is selling antibiotics under the current system of incentives, these diagnostics can only decrease its sales and are therefore financially undesirable. In contrast, under the aHIF, the company would have a significant financial incentive to promote appropriate use of diagnostics. Likewise, antibacterial vaccines dampen the demand for antibiotics by 
C. Patent--related issues for the aHIF
As described above, the precise patent policy of the HIF is not an essential design feature, but a functional and practical choice at this stage. We can think of several reasons why various patent policies might work with the HIF generally, but in many cases the analysis is significantly different for the aHIF.
First, by transferring the patent, the company would lose the right to control certain follow--on innovations, which are commercially important in many drug classes. For the aHIF, this issue may be less salient, as a successful aHIF will delay the clinical and financial need for follow--on antibiotics. In antibiotics, we don't necessarily want to promote additional drugs in class on an accelerated timetable.
Society may be better off with spreading antibiotic approvals across a larger number of years, coupled with strong conservation incentives. In any event, the aHIF might need to be an all--or--nothing program, especially if cross--drug and cross--class pollution could not otherwise be controlled.
Second, retaining the patent gives the company additional control over operational issues such as how the drug is used in drug combinations, with companion diagnostics, and potential early exit rights under the aHIF contract. All of these issues are enmeshed with the antibiotic pollution externalities described above: in many cases, combination drugs offer much lower resistance profiles; companion diagnostics targets the right drug against the right bug without inappropriate use; but early exit may need to be discouraged or contractually limited in order to protect drugs remaining in the aHIF from pollution.
One advantage of an immediate transfer (or open license) of the patent for a HIF--registered product is that it shifts competition from the molecule to finding more efficient manufacturing methods that might significantly reduce the marginal cost of production. While the company contractually promises production at marginal cost, the HIF does not necessarily create competitive conditions wherein companies strive to drive those costs down. In economic terms, the HIF will address the great majority of the deadweight loss associated with patent--based pricing, but may forego some opportunities for additional social welfare gains through reduced marginal costs. Insofar as manufacturing is outsourced, the incentive to reduce the marginal cost of production for HIF--registered products is powerful, as competing manufacturers will want to be able to submit the lowest bid. Insofar as manufacturing is not outsourced, the firm will still want to lower its manufacturing cost. For even if the firm's best option is to sell at cost, regardless of what this cost is, the firm will achieve more health impact if the product is sold at a lower price. The firm is better off producing and selling at $4 than at $5. In the context of antibiotics, these issues are muted somewhat, since maximizing production volume and minimizing unit costs are not the primary objectives. Indeed, universal misuse of free antibiotics would be a public health problem. A key issue here is that while the aHIF could stretch out or delay the reward period for antibiotics, such that the incentives for conservation were adequate, patents would inevitably expire, opening a path for uncontrolled generic production. Therefore, to the extent that cross--molecule and cross--class pollution cannot otherwise be controlled, a key component of antibiotics in the aHIF would be an international agreement not to permit other firms to sell aHIF--rewarded antibiotics, regardless of the patent status. Put another way, pollution externalities might require all antibiotics to be in the aHIF.
Some have suggested longer patents for antibiotics. 61 Without the aHIF, simply extending exclusivity rights is a non--starter, since it opens up opportunities for exploitation of consumers by innovators without any clear conservation gains. 62
Within the aHIF mechanism, extending exclusivity rights is consistent with maintaining roughly the same level of profits while improving clinical and conservation outcomes.
James Love has criticized the HIF for not relying on generic production to ensure the lowest possible marginal cost of production. 63 As discussed above, we find these concerns to be addressed by the companies' incentives to realize the greatest health impact at the lowest possible contractual price. But in the context of antibiotics, this criticism gains even less traction. Global public health is clearly advanced by wide dissemination of quality generic statins to treat cardiovascular disease; the same cannot be said for antibiotics with resistance problems. We suggest that unconstrained generic production of antibiotics might make the global conservation effort more difficult, tipping the long--term ecological and evolutionary balance in the wrong direction. Further research is clearly needed on this question.
Finally, the patent holder may hesitate to transfer the patent in advance of the 10--year HIF reward payments. The HIF will gain credibility as a counterparty over time, so perhaps this issue will diminish in importance in future years.
Antibiotics do not appear to present novel questions for this specific issue.
V. Conclusion
The antibiotic sector is an attractive but complex candidate for testing the Health Impact Fund. Poor market incentives have led both industry and academic researchers to suggest de--linkage mechanisms as a means to simultaneously address problems with conservation and R&D. The looming crisis of antibiotic resistance is an important global problem. Resistant diseases are significant health risks throughout the world. This problem threatens both high--and low--income populations, and it may prove impossible to solve without an effective global coordination mechanism. The aHIF demonstration, while modestly sized compared to global pharmaceutical markets, is probably large enough to alter incentives in the antibiotic sector. Some of the criticisms raised about the HIF apply with less force in the antibiotic sector, making it an attractive candidate for a full--scale test. The aHIF is not without significant challenges. Financing must be robust and sustainable. Adequate and realistic resistance targets will have to be set globally, without political meddling. Achieving these targets will be partially delegated to the companies, but they will also be accountable to the aHIF for failing to hit the mark.
Drug companies will therefore be encouraged to cooperate for global public health in unprecedented ways, with equally impressive impacts on global health.
